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Trade and debt are simply two faces of one coin. All
debt represents a deferred claim on goods and must
ultimately be repaid by the transfer of goods from
debtors to creditors. International debt, more
specifically, represents deferred international trade.
The transfer of goods must take the form of a real
trade surplus, if the aim is to cover the real interest on
international debt, and of a real current account
surplus, if the aim is to repay debt. It follows that,
unless there are offsetting changes in the balance on
factor services or in the capital account, adjustment to
a change in either the availability of external capital or
in interest rates must necessarily take the form of an
alteration in the trade balances of both debtor and
creditor countries.
These simple facts underlie the relation between trade
and debt. Adjustment to a declining willingness to
lend or to higher interest rates involves acceptance by
creditors of a reduced trade surplus and by debtors of
a reduced deficit. The trade positions of creditor and
debtor countries may even switch. These adjustments
in trade balances can be painful. They will be more
painful the more they are resisted and the more
inefficiently they are carried out. The ability to carry
out the required adjustments in a reasonably smooth
and harmonious manner is, therefore, a necessary
(although not a sufficient) condition for a resolution
of what has come to be called 'the debt crisis'.
Adjustments in trade balances involve trade policy in
two respects. In the first place, adjustments need to
occur not only in the overall balance between
expenditure and output in both creditor and debtor
economies but also in the composition of their output
and expenditure. For these processes to work
reasonably well, economies must be able to shift from
one activity to another in a flexible manner. In the case
of debtor countries, in particular, it is important that
reductions in domestic expenditures lead readily to
increased exports. Otherwise, adjustment will tend to
occur in the most inefficient possible way, via import
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compression alone. Protection is, however, not only a
prime source of economic inflexibility, but is also an
indirect tax on exports. Those indebted economies
which are highly protected will, therefore, prove
unable to adjust effectively.
In the second place, trade policy in the major markets
of the world, which are also the domiciles of the major
creditor institutions, will determine the way in which
the external adjustment - that is, the transfer of
resources from debtor to creditor countries - is made.
If the reduction in the trade deficits of the debtor
countries is to occur in a reasonably efficient manner,
these countries must achieve both export expansion
and import reduction. Creditor countries must,
therefore, accommodate the increased exports from
indebted countries. If the latter cannot expand their
exports because of protection abroad, they can service
debt only by compression of imports. The resulting
domestic economic disruption and resentment against
the creditor countries will make maintenance of a
cooperative approach to the task of servicing debt very
difficult indeed, if not altogether impossible.
In the present analysis it is assumed that voluntary
lending sufficient to finance previous trade deficits is
no longer available, while coerced lending is neither a
long term solution nor, in any case, equal in amount to
previous voluntary lending. Consequently, adjust-
ments to trade balances are necessary and inevitable.
In other words, a 'real' solution to the problem of
international indebtedness is required. A 'real'
solution involves accommodation by creditor countries
and export expansion by debtor countries. Failing
both, there will be stagnation in debtor countries and
perhaps even cumulative deflation in the world
economy. In such circumstances, it will be recognised
in time that the financial claims on the debtor
countries' economies are of little value. While
indebted countries may be willing to transfer resources
to their creditors year after year - although even this
can be doubted - they are far less likely to do so if the
price is a sustained depression in their economies.
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In order to elaborate these points, the discussion
below i) explains the nature of the debt service
problem; ii) points out the defects in the present
adjustment process and the implications for trade; iii)
emphasises the need for faster growth in the world
economy; iv) stresses the damaging effects of the
widespread distortions in the market process; and y)
argues that improved trade policy is needed in both
creditor and debtor countries, in order to make faster
growth and efficient adjustment feasible.
Nature of the Debt-service Problem
Credit, as the origin ofthe word suggests, derives from
faith. Correspondingly, a credit crisis is a crisis of
confidence, a situation in which faith in the fulfilment
of obligations can no longer be taken for granted. In
the current situation, however, confidence on the side
of both the creditors and the debtors has deteriorated,
which is to say the willingness to supply credit
voluntarily has contracted. On both sides there has
indeed been ample room for the growth of mutually
compounding suspicions. Bankers, for their part,
know that the debtors face strong domestic pressures
against transfers of resources abroad over the long
term; meanwhile, many citizens of indebted countries
feel that banks pulled the rug from under them in 1982
or even that the problem has been created almost
entirely by the policies of key developed countries.
Credit is a borrowed or, put another way, a temporary
command over real resources. The only real resources
available for lending are that portion of current
earnings which the persons (individuals and enter-
prises) who earned them have decided, for the time
being, not to consume; in short, the only real resources
available for lending are current savings.
Since the late 1970s the savings available for
productive investment have been declining as a
proportion of world income, because of the growth of
budget deficits in both developed and developing
countries and also because of the disappearance of the
OPEC surplus. There is now, in effect, increased
competition for a smaller amount of savings. In
addition, there are fears about the inflationary
consequences of large budget deficits. These fears
themselves raise the apparent real rate of interest on
long-term lending because current rates of inflation
are lower than those expected in the future.
Furthermore, uncertainty about the course of policies
may itself increase the risk premium in long-term rates
of interest, while tight monetary poliÇy will tend to
raise the opportunity cost of illiquidity.
To the change in nominal and real interest rates within
developed countries must be added the appreciation of
the dollar (in which some two-thirds of developing
lo
country debt is denominated) and the deterioration in
the terms of trade of many developing countries.
Because of the interaction of these effects, real interest
rates for some developing countries rose to over 15 per
cent in the early l980s - levels at which merely
borrowing to re-finance interest puts ratios of debt to
gross domestic product (GDP) and to exports on
explosive paths.
The intensity of the competition for available savings
and high rates of interest has three implications for
developing countries.
First, it implies that, if new capital is tobe obtained on
a sustained basis, developing countries will have to
find projects offering higher returns than many have
offered in the past.
Secondly, a significant portion of outstanding debt
will have to be serviced out of current income, it now
being far more difficult to find new capital to cover
debt service payments. Until the end of the 1970s, by
way of contrast, most debtors were able to obtain new
borrowings sufficient not only to re-finance out-
standing principal but also to cover interest payments.
Moreover, because of low real rates of interest and
rapid real growth in export revenues, developing
countries could borrow to cover debt service and still
have improving debt-service ratios. It was therefore
unnecessary for them to service debt out of current
income. Indeed, with the interest rates of the l970s it
was hard to owe too much - or so it seemed at the
time.
Finally, the rise in real rates of interest means that the
burden of servicing the large outstanding debt out of
current income is higher than it would have been
previously.
It is the need to service debt out of current income
combined with the high cost of doing so at current real
rates of interest that is at the heart of what is called the
debt crisis'.
In the right economic circumstances, developing
countries should be able to find many projects that
offer high returns. The immediate question, though, is
how to service debt in the most efficient way, on the
assumption that new borrowing will no longer be
available in sufficient quantity to render unnecessary
the task of servicing debt out of current income.
When facing up to the task, many developing
countries are handicapped by the uses to which
borrowed funds were put in the past. Thus a part of the
outstanding debt was borrowed by governments to
finance current expenditure or by state industrial
enterprises for covering current operating deficits. It
has been consumed. Indeed, in some developing
countries the ratio of the public sector deficit to GDP
has been as high as 15 per cent. At the same time, at
least in many Latin American countries, borrowing
abroad was accompanied by relatively large outflows
of domestic capital - especially in the early 1980s.
While governments and public-sector institutions are
responsible for servicing gross indebtedness, the
foreign-currency earnings of the assets held abroad are
not available to them for debt-service purposes, unless
their owners can be induced to repatriate them. To the
extent, then, that borrowed resources have been
consumed or offset by private outflows, the stock of
debt does not itself generate the income from which it
can be serviced. To service the deadweight debt, either
other income has to be found, chiefly by taxing other
activities, or governments must take those actions that
will restore the confidence of their citizens and so
induce the repatriation of assets held abroad.
The servicing problem of the debtor countries can be
analysed, conceptually, in two parts. The debt-
carrying entities must produce a surplus in their
current operations equal to the amount of debt service
(less any new credit obtained). This first stage may be
called the domestic-currency equivalent of debt-service
charges. To service foreign debts, however, domestic
resources must be translated into foreign exchange for
remittance to the creditors. This second stage may be
called the transfer problem. Both aspects have been
creating difficulties.
Defects in the Present Adjustment Process
That the internal adjustment of debtor countries
would be painful was inevitable. The combined
current account deficit of developing countries in 1982
of $lOObn was equal to about 3.5 per cent of their
combined GNP, but after removing some large
countries with modest debt like India and China the
ratio was over 5 per cent. For some of the larger Latin
American debtors the ratios in 1981 ranged from
4.5 per cent for Brazil, to 5.5 per cent for Argentina,
8.0 per cent for Mexico and 16.5 per cent for Chile.
Meanwhile, for South Korea the ratio was 6.5 per cent.
The reductions in real expenditures in relation to
output that are required to close - or even
substantially reduce - such large current account
deficits are substantial.
The need to reduce current account deficits in many
indebted developing countries was the inevitable
consequence of the decline in lending. Net disburse-
ments of medium and long-term private loans to
developing countries fell from $50 bn in 1981 to $34 bn
in 1982, with most of the drop occurring in the second
half of the year. In the first quarter of 1983 net private
lending was only $2.6 bn and most of this consisted of
involuntary lending under the auspices of IMF
rescheduling agreements.
On the internal side, the required adjustments to this
sharp decline in lending have taken two forms: an
overt attempt to reduce the size of the public sector
deficit and a de facto increase in taxation through a rise
in the inflation tax. The attention paid to public sector
deficits is inevitable, since they tend to be reflected
almost automatically in current account deficits in the
balance of payments. It is possible that the private
sector, representing often the smaller part of the
economy, could produce a surplus which more than
offsets the public sector deficit, but very strong
pressure on expenditure by the private sector would
then be required.
In practice, it has been impossible to avoid adverse
effects on the private sector. Quite apart from higher
taxes, there has also been a tendency towards
accelerated inflation. Indeed, the acceleration in
inflation that has occurred in a number of the
principal debtor countries is not an accident. It is one
way for existing public sector deficits to be financed.
Closing the deficits by increased taxation (whether
overt or covert) has, in turn, tended to lead to a
squeeze on the private sector with potentially serious
consequences for long-term investment and growth.
Theoretically, the closing of internal deficits, however
painful in itself, should be translated smoothly into an
improvement in the current account balance. In this
sense the 'transfer problem' is secondary. Indeed, the
external aspects of the transfer do not look to be
anything like as daunting as the required internal
adjustments. For the developed countries increased
absorption of $100 bn worth of goods and services
would be needed to offset the elimination of the entire
nominal deficit of developing countries (while
avoiding deflation). Such an increase in absorption
implies an expansion of total expenditures in their
economies of only just over one per cent. Moreover,
the output of tradeable goods and services in the
developed countries need contract by no more than
about 2 per cent, other things being equal, to effect the
transfer. Indeed, in the context of economic recovery
no overall shrinkage of these industries would appear
to be necessary.
Nevertheless, the external transfer is not proceeding
smoothly, with the result that the internal adjustment
is turning out to be still more painful than might, in
any case, be expected. There are two principal reasons
for this, both of which are related to the difficulty the
indebted countries are having in expanding exports.
One reason is the high levels of protection in many of
the indebted economies themselves, a protection
which has actually tended to increase as stringent
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programmes to curb imports have been introduced on
an emergency basis. The result is that the profitability
of production for export, already low, has tended to
decline still further. A second reason, not unrelated to
the first, is that a substantial proportion (depending
on the country) of the exports of debtor countries face
restrictions and other obstacles in foreign markets,
these usually being concentrated against the exports of
industries in which the debtor countries have the
greatest comparative advantage. 'Pushing out exports'
against such resistance in foreign countries calls for
the exertion of great pressure. Furthermore, even the
fear of such barriers leads indebted countries to
despair of success with exports and to introduce
inward-looking policies that tend to make the
prophecies of export gloom self-fulfilling.
Because of the difficulty in expanding exports, imports
are cut instead. But many of the imports of developing
countries are intermediate or investment goods; that
is, they are essential inputs into current or future
production. Hence, as a result of the need simply to
adjust expenditures in relation to output, there is also
a large loss of both present and future output. That
loss of output then makes necessary a still sharper
reduction in expenditures than would otherwise be
necessary. This is why adjustment through the
expansion of exports, which would allow fuller use of
existing capacity and so tend to expand output, is so
much more desirable than adjustment through the
contraction of imports, which in most developing
countries means the reverse.
In the context of the declining availability of external
capital, developing countries have, willy nilly,
improved their trade balances since 1982. In oil-
importing developing countries the current account
deficit (excluding official transfers) fell from $82 bn in
1981 to $66 bn in 1982 and an estimated $46 bn in
1983. For oil-exporting developing countries the
deficit fell from $32 bn in 1982 to an estimated $10 bn
in 1983. Indeed, the combined deficit in 1983 was only
a little larger than the interest due in that year.
This performance has been impressive, but costly.
Unfortunately, evidence suggests that, to date, much
of the adjustment has emphasised the reduction of
imports. In many countries these improvements have,
in other words, resulted largely from cutting imports
relative to output and from recession-induced
reductions in demand for imports. Imports were cut in
real terms by about half in Argentina in 1982, by about
40 per cent in Mexico in 1982, by 30 per cent in
Venezuela in 1983, and progressively by about 33 per
cent between 1980 and 1983 in Brazil. In Brazil
imports as a proportion of GDP fell from 6 to 4.6 per
cent between 1980 and 1983 and in Chile from 30.4 to
21.3 per cent. In many cases imports have been cut to
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the point where they consist only of industrial raw
materials and essential foodstuffs with little even for
investment.
Only a few countries have managed to expand exports
sufficiently to avoid serious domestic recession. Korea
and Turkey, for example, had sizable foreign debts;
but by following effective adjustment policies, they
succeeded in expanding both their real imports and
exports during the 1980s. By contrast, the real value of
exports declined in Argentina and Venezuela between
1981 and 1983 and was stagnant in Brazil.
In short, the present adjustment process involves large
and inevitable cuts in real expenditures in developing
country debtors. These cuts have had to include
reductions in public sector expenditures. The problem
is that these cuts are going only in part into
improvements in the balance of payments and are
having a large depressing effect on domestic
economies. A major reason is the failure to expand
exports. partly because of external resistance to such
exports but mainly because of the consequences for
exports of domestic protection. The main result of this
inefficient pattern of adjustment has been sharp -
and increasingly politically intolerable - reductions
in consumption per capur in many indebted countries.
In 1982, for example. consumption per caput fell by
10 per cent in Argentina, by 6 per cent in Mexico, and
by 3 per cent in Brazil.
Need for Sustained Growth
How, then, is the problem of developing country debt
to be resolved in the least painful and most efficient
way? 'In the context of a vigorous and sustained
recovery in the world economy' is the obvious answer.
What difference would that make?
Whatever the international environment, those
governments which have used past borrowing to
support an overvalued rate of exchange and an
inefficient domestic policy regime must now retrench.
Moreover, those adjustments must include not only a
reduction in public-sector deficits but also measures to
improve efficiency in the use of resources. It is only in
this way that the consequences for production -
present and future - of reductions in expenditure can
be minimised and that renewed borrowing for
investment will be justified. Hence debtors should be
discouraged from 'adjusting' by imposing greatly
increased burdens on the private sector (by raising the
inflation tax, for example) or by attempting to 'save
foreign exchange largely by reducing imports via
import controls. At best, the two actions are
immensely costly ways of adjusting; and, at worst,
they make adjustment ultimately impossible.
Even so, in a sluggish world economy, debtor
countries are all too likely to service their current debt
by maintaining severe macroeconomic pressure and
imposing import restrictions, with economic stag-
nation, widespread unemployment and political
unrest resulting as a matter of course. This is not a
politically sustainable course.
In the past two years, the IMF has probably been the
most important interlocutor between the creditor
countries and the debtor countries, forced into trying
single-handedly to make good debtors out of bad
ones, with the creditors themselves not under effective
pressure to change any significant aspect of their own
behaviour, except by providing the JMF with more
money. There is no doubt that the IMF is an
invaluable instrument. But it may be overwhelmed by
current expectations of its role. What is missing inter
a/ia is a willingness on the part of creditor countries to
change their policies.
The essential point is that, if the world economy were
again to grow in a sustained way, the problems facing
the debtor countries would be substantially eased.
First, prices and volumes of export commodities
would rise, which would be directly beneficial for both
their national income and public revenue.
Secondly, provided faster growth in the world
economy was accompanied by diminished pro-
tectionism (as it would probably have to be if the
increased rate of growth was to be maintained),
improved access to markets would give their exports a
more permanent boost, greatly increasing the
likelihood that the debtor countries would be able to
adjust through efficient expansion of exports.
Their rate of growth would then be higher and, with
higher growth of national income and exports, they
could borrow more. In this context, it should be
remembered that as long as the real rate of interest on
borrowing is lower than the growth of the debtor's
national income, a continued net capital inflow is
consistent with stability in the ratio of debt to GNP. In
spite of continued high real rates of interest, therefore,
the prospect of a return to rapid growth in the debtor
countries, following the required retrenchment in the
short term, would play a part in restoring their
creditworthiness and relieving pressure both on them
and on the creditor institutions.
Restoring the Price System
The current recovery in the United States will not of
itself solve the problem unless followed by the
adoption of policy measures to raise economic growth
in the world economy as a whole over the longer term.
The debtor countries should not be the only ones
encouraged to undertake such measures, for in
microcosm, although in extreme form, their problems
are those of the world economy at large.
The widespread distortions and rigidities in national
price systems, and hence the impairment of the
international price system, can persist only to the
extent that national economies are shielded by
protection from pressures emanating in world
markets. In its annual report for 1982/83 the GATT
secretariat has actually asked what is left of the price
mechanism. The report points out that all studies
indicate that protectionism has been steadily increas-
ing. Given the growth of subsidies and regulation.
there can be little surprise that what investment is
taking place appears not to be yielding the fruit
expected. A long-term tendency to low growth reflects
persistent economic waste.
Such have been the domestic circumstances in which
the adherence of governments to GATT principles
and rules has been steadily weakening for nearly two
decades. In the early l970s, governments began
reaffirming, in one declaration after another, their
commitment to GATT principles and rules. But they
continued to feel obliged to make exceptions to the
rules, always for reasons which seemed plausible in the
short term, hoping no doubt to maintain the integrity
of the rules as a whole in the longer term.
Increasing resort to non-tariff measures has under-
mined the force of GATT rules. But worse, the GATT
system per se has been undermined by the increasing
resort to extra-GATT means of protecting industries
unable to cope with foreign competition, these chiefly
being 'voluntary' export restraint agreements,
negotiated bilaterally and euphemistically referred to
as 'informal' or 'grey area' measures. Through them
and other non-tariff measures, notably sector-specific
subsidies, separate extra-GATT systems of protection
have been developed for entire industries, including
agriculture, textiles and clothing, shipbuilding, steel
and automobiles.
Towards a Long-term Solution
What is required from the rest of the world in order to
accommodate and facilitate the necessary efforts to
adjust in the debtor countries? In the short term,
rescheduling of existing debt, official provision of new
credit and encouragement to commercial banks to
keep lending with all be needed, largely in order to buy
time. A permanent solution, however, demands
changes on the 'real' side of the world economy, most
of all accelerated economic growth and an increased
ability in the rest of the world to accommodate the
efforts being made by the debtor countries themselves
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to service their debts through increased export
earnings.
The best policy for achieving both higher growth and
improved accommodation of imports is the vigorous
pursuit of trade liberalisation. Ultimately, a credible
programme of trade liberalisation must change rigid
economic structures, abolish outmoded ways of doing
business and thereby increase flexibility in labour and
capital markets, for in an open economy there is
simply nowhere for the inefficient to hide.
The international debt situation demands prompt
action. While the preparation for a global trade
initiative continues, it should be possible to start a
negotiating process in which developing countries can
seek immediate action on tariffs and non-tariff
measures which inhibit their exports to developed
countries, while offering the possibility of action on
their own tariffs and import controls. The achievement
of 'transparency' in trade restrictions is an objective
that should be pursued at the same time. Such
negotiations under GATT auspices would require first
of all the active involvement of the debtor countries
and their principal trading partners, but under the
GATT's provisions and multilateral procedures the
negotiations would be open to other GATT members
countries, with whatever 'concessions' that were
agreed being extended on a most-favoured-nation
basis to all GATT member countries.
There can be no minimising the difficulty of launching
such a trade negotiation. Many of the developing
countries that are having difficulty servicing their
debts are efficient producers and exporters of products
which are heavily supported and protected in many of
the creditor countries (eg agriculture, textiles and
steel). Moreover, both the developing countries that
are having difficulty servicing their debts and the other
developing countries - including those in danger of
14
encountering debt-service problems - which are
adversely affected by the protectionist and discri-
minatory policies of developed countries are only
going to be persuaded about the merits of such a trade
negotiation if it is expected to yield improved access to
markets, improved security in trade flows and
improved prospects for economic development.
On the question of a global trade initiative, the
developed countries need to examine more rigorously
than they have to date the possibilities for action on
specific issues of special concern to developing
countries, such as the tendencies to discriminate
against the more successful among them and to
develop sectoral systems of protection. At the same
time, the developing countries need to generate a
greater appreciation of the benefits for their economic
development that could result from a readiness on
their part to liberalise their trade regimes.
Meanwhile, liberalisation by debtor countries should
in any case be an essential element in every debt-relief
negotiation, since the more distorted their domestic
policy regimes the less probable it is that they will
develop the kinds of high-return investments and
achieve the sort of export growth which will again
make them creditworthy in the long run.
Austerity is not enough. Changes are needed that hold
out hope to the debtor countries of renewed economic
growth and renewed borrowing. What is needed,
therefore, is a restoration of the proper functioning of
the market mechanism in both developed and
developing countries. This would follow automatically
from measures to liberalìse trade and eliminate sector-
specific subsidies. Stabilisation without liberalisation
is likely to yield stagnation; and in such a world,
international cooperation would not endure. Measures
to restore the efficiency of the real economy, through
trade liberalisation, are at the heart of any long-term
resolution of the debt crisis.
